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This note criticizes the statutory requirement that the 
validity of an electronic signature depends on its being 
as reliable as appropriate in the circumstances. This 
requirement unfairly discriminates against electronic 
signatures (having no equivalent for signatures 
on paper). Common law does not impose any form 
requirements on what can be a signature, so no statutory 
standard is needed to support an e-signature. The law 
should not impose a standard of prudence that must vary 
among transactions and among parties to them. Finally, 
the reliability standard risks invalidating e-signatures 
that are demonstrably genuine. Neither consumer 
protection nor high security needs justify the generic 
reliability rule.
The United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
of 1996,1 the basis for the laws on electronic transactions 
in many countries around the world, provides that when 
the law requires a signature, the requirement may be met 
by a method that identifies the person who is supposed 
to sign, indicates his or her approval of the information, 
and ‘that method is as reliable as was appropriate for 
the purpose for which the data message was generated 
or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, 
including any relevant agreement.’2 
I am very sceptical of any legal requirement that 
electronic signatures must be as reliable as appropriate 
in the circumstances. We thought of using such a 
requirement when we drafted the Uniform Electronic 
Commerce Act3 in Canada, and decided against it. The 
official commentary on the Uniform Act says this:
Although the UN Model Law makes an electronic 
signature meet a test of appropriate reliability in order 
to meet a signature requirement, the Uniform Law 
Conference felt that such a test would detract from the 
“media neutrality” of the Uniform Act. However, where 
the authorities responsible for a signature requirement 
take the view that the requirement does imply some 
degree of reliability of identification or of association 
with the document to be signed, they may under 
subsection (2) make a regulation to impose a reliability 
standard. The language of subsection (2) is based on 
that in the Model Law.4 
All of the common law provinces and all the territories 
have implemented the Uniform Act and all but two 
have maintained the open-ended provision of that Act. 
None has made a regulation of the kind described in 
the annotation. Manitoba5 requires reliability for an 
electronic signature on ‘a document of a prescribed class’, 
though none seems to have been prescribed yet. Prince 
Edward Island6 has a definition of ‘electronic signature’ 
derived from the UN Model Law on Electronic Signatures, 
though its parliamentary debates give no reasons for 
this deviation from the Uniform Act, otherwise closely 
adhered to, and no courts appear to have been called on 
to interpret the provision.
The first reason for not having a reliability rule is that 
there is no such rule for handwritten signatures (or any of 
the other marks on paper that may constitute a signature 
at law). The person relying on a signature always takes 
the risk that the signature is not genuine, so he or she 
acts accordingly. That is to say, the relying party evaluates 
the risk that the signature is not genuine and protects 
himself or herself or itself accordingly. This may involve 
checking the signature against known genuine versions 
of it, or getting the signature witnessed, or getting the 
signature notarized, or getting the signature guaranteed 
by a bank, or various other techniques. The risk analysis 
will of course include the cost of having the signature 
made more reliable and the cost of its being not genuine. 
So a course of dealings with the purported signer, or a 
low-value transaction, may persuade someone to rely on 
a signature that from a stranger or for a high value would 
not be satisfactory.
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These precautions and judgments are not a matter 
of law but a matter of prudence. The law applicable to 
electronic signatures can be the same.
Second, the common law does not impose any form 
requirement on signatures – which means it is arguable 
that an electronic signature is a good signature without 
any law reform.7 At common law, I can sign something 
by authorizing someone else to sign my name – meaning 
that a handwritten signature may not look like what I 
would write but is mine and enforceable against me 
nonetheless. (There are questions of proof in all of this 
– and so there are in e-signature questions – but they 
should not distort the law on the point.) Likewise I can 
sign by machine (with the same practical questions). If I 
can sign by a machine that prints my name – possibly but 
not necessarily in the form of my handwritten signature 
– then why should I not sign with a machine that creates 
electrons that link me with the text?
The basic – arguably the only – common function of 
a signature is to link a person (i.e. legal entity) with a 
document.8 Nothing in the form of the signature states 
the legal effect of that link. One cannot know the link 
without knowing the context – starting with the obvious 
question what the document is that bears the signature 
(or to which the signature relates). The context will always 
have to be demonstrated, whether on paper or electronic. 
Sometimes that will be hard, most of the time it will be 
easy.
But the important point remains: it is not the form of 
the signature that gives it any legal effect. Therefore any 
information in any medium that is capable of linking a 
legal entity with a document (electronic or paper or other) 
should be able to be a signature at law.
There is a mental element in a signature: the person 
must have an intention to sign the document, though 
the reason for the intention may vary.9 The Uniform 
Electronic Commerce Act defined an electronic signature 
by saying it was ‘created or adopted in order to sign a 
document’.10 In other words, it incorporated the same 
mental element for e-signatures that the (common) law 
requires for all signatures. It made no legal distinction 
between the purpose or intention of an e-signature and 
those of a signature on paper. That mental element 
will be shown, once again, by the context (such as text 
saying ‘signed by’) rather than by use of a particular 
technique or technology. The reliability of the context to 
do this can be shown for electronic signatures as it can 
be for handwritten or otherwise mechanically produced 
signatures, without a special statutory rule.
Third, in my view law reform should not restrict this 
flexibility of the common law. There are many examples 
where the law will give effect to practices that may not 
be prudent for people to engage in. People are expected 
to be prudent. An ‘X’ in pencil on a piece of disposable 
tissue paper can be a legally effective signature, but most 
people would not accept a valuable contract made on 
such a medium with such a signature, because the risks 
are too great.
Part of the challenge is that people have many years 
of experience in evaluating how reliable a signature on 
paper is, and thus can judge what is prudent. People are 
much less familiar with the potentials and vulnerabilities 
of methods of signing electronically. However, I would 
submit that the law does not add any value to this lack 
of familiarity with an ‘appropriate reliability’ test. Such 
a test merely transfers the prudential judgment from 
the relying party to a judge – who may be no more 
competent to make it, though he or she may have the 
advantage of expert evidence. It may be a complicated 
decision. The Guide to Enactment of the Model Law on 
E-Commerce sets out fourteen different considerations 
for ‘the circumstances’ in which a signing method is to be 
judged reliable.11 Such considerations are also available 
to the relying party – at a more useful time, before the 
transaction is consummated.
The Federal Court of Australia decided in Getup Ltd 
v Electronic Commissioner12 that indeed the entity 
to which the e-signature was submitted, and which 
was intended to rely on it, did not have the power to 
determine its reliability. Only the court could do this. In 
other words, the parties to a communication using an 
electronic signature are always subject to having their 
choices held invalid by a court – or in the Getup case, 
held valid though the party intended to rely on it did not 
think it was sufficiently reliable for its purposes. Either 
way, this seems undesirable. (In common-law Canada, 
the Getup decision would have gone the other way, both 
because the applicable statutes do not compel anyone 
to accept an electronic communication – as discussed in 
more detail below – and because a government or public 
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body may in addition impose its information technology 
requirements on any incoming e-document or e-signature, 
to ensure compatibility with its systems and its judgment 
of reliability.13)
Fourth, a reliability requirement risks becoming a 
trap for the unwary, or a potential loophole for the 
unscrupulous. One can readily imagine a situation 
where the relying party knows the person who created 
an electronic signature and there is no question about 
the link to a document – yet tries to avoid an agreement 
by saying ‘yes, I know all that, but the method of the 
e-signature was not reliable enough for this transaction, 
so the signature, and thus the transaction, cannot be 
valid.’ The person who created the signature cannot know 
at the time of creating it – at the time of the e-transaction 
that the ‘enabling’ legislation is intended to facilitate – 
whether a court will hold it to be appropriately reliable. 
The other party can argue it is not that reliable, in bad 
faith, possibly. For that matter, the person creating the 
signature might use the same argument: ‘Yes, I signed it, 
but it did not meet the legal test for validity.’
Probably most court systems would resist allowing 
either of the parties to a signed document to use this kind 
of argument to invalidate a transaction they participated 
in. The more substantial risk is an attack on that ground 
by a third party, someone not involved in the transaction 
but who has a motive to invalidate it. One thinks of 
tax authorities, trustees in bankruptcy, possibly even 
ex-spouses, who would like to see assets owned by one 
party and not by another. Because of the complexity of 
the evaluation, as noted above, a judge could readily 
come to a different conclusion than the parties on the 
reliability question. It is not clear what public interest is 
served by such a result.
In short, the reliability test does not deal with what 
parties should reasonably be expected to ascertain – who 
signed what for what purpose? It adds an unforeseeable 
element, an optional escape method, for attacking a 
signature with respect to which all relevant questions 
are answered. And it does not help answer any of those 
questions independently.
I would also submit that the list of tests in the Model 
Law on Electronic Signatures14 (article 6(3)) adds little 
of real value as well, but that is a whole different set of 
arguments. It would often if not usually be harder to 
prove compliance with the technical standard than to 
authenticate the document directly. 
It is worth noting that the UN Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts,15 
adopted in 2005, expanded on the grounds for validity 
of electronic signatures. Besides the reliability test, 
which was vigorously contested at the meeting where 
the Convention was adopted,16 the Convention allows for 
validity of a method of identifying a person and indicating 
the person’s intention in respect of information if the 
method is ‘proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions 
described in subparagraph (a) above, by itself or together 
with further evidence.’17 Authentication in practice, not 
just in principle, can be effective in law.
Is consumer protection an exception to my argument 
against a reliability test, since consumers may be even 
less able to judge prudence of accepting an e-signature 
than a commercial party? I doubt that consumers would 
be helped by an open-ended reliability requirement 
either. They too can be trapped by it. Consumers probably 
need to know identity more than they need to see a 
signature as such demonstrated. So consumer protection 
in e-commerce should depend more on enforcing full 
disclosure of identity, place of business, and rights 
and remedies for the transaction than the artificial 
and generally irrelevant consideration of the form of a 
signature.18 
All this discussion assumes that there actually are rules 
of law that require a signature, since if there are not, 
the enabling legislation based on the Model Laws does 
not apply at all. It does not apply to support or weaken 
a signature on a private transaction not covered by any 
statutory requirement. All the more reason not to have 
any unpredictable technical demands. In the few cases 
when the issue may come up, the parties will be even less 
expecting such a strange loophole.19 
One way the Uniform Act in Canada leaves reliability 
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to the parties is its consent rule. It says that nothing in 
the Act requires any person to use or accept information 
in electronic form.20 If one can refuse an electronic 
document, or an electronic signature, then one can accept 
it if it is sufficiently reliable – not in some abstract sense, 
not in a way determined by a judge two years later, but 
at the time of use. The consent rule, in other words, gives 
the potential relying party a clear opportunity to decide if 
the electronic signing method is satisfactory to it. If not, 
the party can insist on paper documentation.
There may be a case for spelling out more detailed 
requirements where signatures must be more reliable 
than usual, or where the decision on reliability should 
not be left to the immediate parties to the documents. 
This additional caution applies to handwritten signatures 
as well. Common law jurisdictions often provide, for 
example, that wills requires two signatures of witnesses 
both present at the same time and signing at the same 
time. Canada’s statutes to this effect are excluded 
from our electronic commerce statutes.21 In any event, 
a generic reliability test adds little protection to such 
circumstances. In cases needing extra security, one 
would arguably want to be less technology neutral and 
more prescriptive. Another Canadian example: Ontario’s 
electronic system for registering land transfers,22 depends 
on a thoroughly prescribed network of digital signatures 
and identities certified by the Law Society.
None of this justifies restricting people signing normal 
documents electronically to a standard of reliability that 
is unsound in theory and misleading or even dangerous in 
practice.
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